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1 Introduction
For a setting in which a large number of asymmetrically informed agents are
randomly matched into groups over time, exchanging their information with
each other when matched, we provide an explicit solution for the dynamics
of the cross-sectional distribution of posterior beliefs. We also show that con-
vergence of the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs to a common posterior
is exponential and that the rate of convergence does not depend on the size
of the groups of agents that meet. The rate of convergence is merely the
mean rate at which an individual agent is matched.
For example, suppose that each agent has λ meetings per year, in expec-
tation. At each meeting, say an auction, m − 1 other agents are randomly
selected to attend. Each agent at the meeting reveals to the others a sum-
mary statistic of his or her posterior, such as a bid for an asset, reflecting
the agent’s originally endowed information and any information learned from
prior meetings. Over time, the conditional beliefs held across the population
of agents regarding a variable of common concern (such as the payoff of the
auctioned asset) converge to a common posterior. We construct an associated
mathematical model of information transmission and calculate explicitly the
cross-sectional distribution of the posterior beliefs held by the agents at each
time. We show that convergence of these posteriors to a common posterior
is exponential at the rate of λ, regardless of the number m of agents at each
meeting.
An important role of markets and organizations, as argued for example
by Hayek (1945) and Arrow (1974), is to facilitate the transmission of in-
formation that is dispersedly held by its participants. Our results suggest
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that varying the size of the groups in which individuals exchange information
does not facilitate information transmission, at least in terms of the rate of
convergence of posteriors. This point is further addressed at the end of the
paper.
Previous studies have considered the problem of information aggregation
in various contexts. For example, Grossman (1981) proposes the concept of
rational-expectations equilibrium to capture the idea that prices aggregate
information that is disperse in the economy. Wilson (1977), Milgrom (1981),
Vives (1993), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), and Reny and Perry (2006)
provide strategic foundations for the rational-expectations equilibrium con-
cept in centralized markets. In a number of important settings, however,
agents learn from local interactions. For example, in over-the-counter mar-
kets, agents learn from the bids of other agents in privately held auctions.
Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2002) study information percola-
tion in these markets.1 In social learning settings, agents learn from direct
interactions with other agents. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) study in-
formation percolation in a social learning context. In contrast to previous
studies of learning through local interactions, we allow for meetings that have
more than two agents, and we explicitly characterize the percolation of infor-
mation and provide rates of convergence of the cross-sectional distribution
of beliefs to a common posterior.
Our results extend those of Duffie and Manso (2007), who provided an
explicit formula for the Fourier transform of the cross-sectional distribution
of posterior beliefs in the same setting, but did not offer an explicit solution
for the distribution itself, and did not characterize the rate of convergence of
the distribution.
Section 2 provides the model setting. Section 3 provides our results for
the traditional search-market setting of bilateral (m = 2) contacts. This also
serves as an introduction to the results for the case of general m, which are
presented in Section 4.
1Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1986a, 1986b) study decentralized markets
without asymmetric information. Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2003) study decentralized
markets with private-value asymmetric information.
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2 The Basic Model
The model of information percolation is that of Duffie and Manso (2007). A
probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a “continuum” (a non-atomic finite measure
space (G,G, γ)) of agents are fixed. Without loss of generality, the total
quantity γ(G) of agents is 1. A random variable X of potential concern
to all agents has two possible outcomes, H (“high”) and L (“low”), with
respective probabilities ν and 1− ν.
Each agent is initially endowed with a sequence of signals that may be
informative about X . The signals {s1, . . . , sn} primitively observed by a
particular agent are, conditional on X , independent with outcomes 0 and 1
(Bernoulli trials). The number n ≥ 0 of signals as well as the probability
distributions of the signals may vary across agents. Without loss of generality,
we suppose that P(si = 1 |H) ≥ P(si = 1 |L). A signal i is informative if
P(si = 1 |H) > P(si = 1 |L). For any pair of agents, their sets of originally
endowed signals are independent.
By Bayes’ rule, conditional on signals {s1, . . . , sn}, the posterior proba-
bility that X has a high outcome is
P(X = H | s1, . . . , sn) =
[
1 +
1− ν
ν
(
1
2
)θ]−1
, (1)
where the “type” θ of this set of signals is
θ =
n∑
i=1
(
si log1/2
P(si = 1 |L)
P(si = 1 |H)
+ (1− si) log1/2
1− P(si = 1 |L)
1− P(si = 1 |H)
)
. (2)
The higher the type θ of the set of signals, the higher is the posterior prob-
ability that X is high.
Any particular agent is matched to other agents at each of a sequence of
Poisson arrival times with a mean arrival rate (intensity) λ, which is common
across agents. At each meeting time,m−1 other agents are randomly selected
from the population of agents.2 The meeting group size m is a parameter
2That is, each of the m− 1 matched agents is chosen at random from the population,
without replacement, with the uniform distribution, which we can take to be the agent-
space measure γ. Duffie and Sun (2007) provide a complete construction for independent
random matching from a large set (a non-atomic measure space) of agents, for the case
m = 2.
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of the information model that we shall vary. We assume that, for almost
every pair of agents, the matching times and counterparties of one agent are
independent of those of the other. We do not show the existence of such a
random matching process.3
Suppose that whenever agents meet they communicate to each other their
posterior probabilities, given all information to the point of that encounter,
of the event that X is high. Duffie and Manso (2007) provide an example
of a market setting in which this revelation of beliefs occurs through the
observation of bids submitted by risk-neutral investors in an auction for a
forward contract on an asset whose payoff is X . From Proposition 3 in Duffie
and Manso (2007), whenever an agent of type θ meets an agent with type φ
and they communicate to each other their posterior distributions of X , they
both attain the posterior type θ+ φ. The same proof implies that whenever
m agents of respective types φ1, . . . , φm share their beliefs, they attain the
common posterior type φ1 + · · ·+ φm.
We let µt denote the cross-sectional distribution of posterior types in the
population at time t. That is, for any real interval (a, b), µt((a, b)) (also
denoted µt(a, b) for simplicity) is the fraction of the population whose type
at time t is in (a, b). Because the total quantity γ(G) of agents is 1, we can
view µt as a probability distribution. The initial distribution µ0 of types is
that induced by some particular initial allocation of signals to agents. In the
following analysis we assume that there is a positive mass of agents that has
at least one informative signal. This implies that the first moment m1(µ0) is
strictly positive if X = H , and that m1(µ0) < 0 if X = L. We assume that
the initial law µ0 has a moment generating function, z 7→
∫
ezθ µ0(dθ), that
is finite on a neighborhood of z = 0.
3 Two-Agent Meetings
We now calculate the explicit belief distribution in the population at any
given time, and the rate of convergence of beliefs to a common posterior, in
3For the case of groups of size m = 2, Duffie and Sun (2007) show existence for the
discrete-time analogue of this random matching model. For the case of a finite number of
agent types, the associated exact law of large numbers for the cross-sectional distribution of
the type processes is provided by Duffie and Sun (2005). Giroux (2005) proves convergence
of the naturally associated finite-agent discrete-time model to the analogous continuous-
time model matching model of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) as the number of
agents grows large.
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a setting withm = 2 agents at each meetings. This is the standard setting for
search-based models of labor, money, and asset markets. In this setting, the
cross-sectional distribution of types is determined by the evolution equation
µt = µ0 + λ
∫ t
0
(µs ∗ µs − µs) ds, (3)
where ∗ is the convolution operator. This is intuitively understood if µt has
a density ft( · ), in which case the density ft(θ) of agents of type θ is reduced
at the rate λft(θ) at which agents of type θ meet other agents and change
type, and is increased at the aggregate rate λ
∫
ft(θ− y)ft(y) dy at which an
agent of some type y meets an agent of type θ− y, and therefore becomes an
agent of type θ.
The following result provides an explicit solution for the cross-sectional
type distribution, in the form of a Wild summation.4
Proposition 1 The unique solution of (3) is
µt =
∑
n≥1
e−λt(1− e−λt)n−1µ∗n0 , (4)
where ν∗n denotes the n-fold convolution of a measure ν.
Proof As in Duffie and Manso (2007), we write the evolution equation (3)
in terms of the Fourier transform ϕ( · , t) of µt, as
∂ϕ(s, t)
∂t
= −λϕ(s, t) + λϕ2(s, t), (5)
with solution
ϕ(s, t) =
ϕ(s, 0)
eλt(1− ϕ(s, 0)) + ϕ(s, 0)
. (6)
This solution can be expanded as
ϕ(s, t) =
∑
n≥1
e−λt(1− e−λt)n−1ϕn(s, 0), (7)
which is identical to the Fourier transform of the right-hand side of (4).
4See Wild (1951).
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This solution for the cross-sectional distribution of types is converted to
an explicit distribution for the cross-sectional distribution pit of posterior
probabilities that X = H , using the fact that
pit(0, b) = µt
(
−∞, log1/2
(1− b)ν
(1− ν)b
)
. (8)
Like µt, the beliefs distribution pit has an outcome that differs depending on
whether X = H or X = L.
We now provide explicit rates of convergence of the cross-sectional distri-
bution of beliefs to a common posterior. In our setting, it turns out that all
agents’ beliefs converge to that of complete information, in that any agent’s
posterior probability of the event {X = H} converges to 1 on this event and
to zero otherwise. In general, we say that pit converges to a common posterior
distribution pi∞ if, almost surely, pit converges in distribution to pi∞, and we
say that convergence is exponential at the rate α > 0 if there are constants
κ0 and κ1 such that, for any b in (0, 1),
e−αtκ0 ≤ |pit(0, b)− pi∞(0, b)| ≤ e
−αtκ1.
Thus, if there is a rate of convergence, it is unique.
Proposition 2 Convergence of the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs to
that of complete information is exponential at the rate λ.
Proof Because of (8), the rate of convergence of pit is the same as the rate
of convergence to zero or 1, for any a, of µt(−∞, a). We will provide the rate
of convergence to zero of µt(−∞, a) on the event X = H . A like argument
gives the same rate of convergence to 1 on the event X = L.
From (4),
µt(−∞, a) ≥ e
−λtµ0(−∞, a). (9)
We fix n0 such that m1(µ0) > a/n for n > n0 and we let {Yn}n≥1 be inde-
pendent random variables with distribution µ0. Then,
µt(−∞, a) =
n0∑
n=1
e−λt(1− e−λt)n−1P
[
n∑
i=1
(
Yi −
a
n
)
≤ 0
]
+
∞∑
n=n0+1
e−λt(1− e−λt)n−1 P
[
n∑
i=1
(
Yi −
a
n
)
≤ 0
]
. (10)
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It is clear that there exists a constant β such that, for all t, the first term on
the right-hand side of equation (10) is less than βe−λt. Therefore, we only
need to worry about the second term on the right-hand side of equation (10).
From a standard result in probability theory,5 if Y is a random variable with
a finite strictly positive mean and a moment generating function that is finite
on (−c, 0] for some c > 0, then P(Y ≤ 0) ≤ inf
−c<s<0
E[esY ] < 1. For n > n0,
for some fixed c > 0, we then have
P
[
n∑
i=1
(
Yi −
a
n
)
≤ 0
]
≤
(
inf
−c<s<0
E
[
es(Y1−a/n)
])n
≤ eacγn, (11)
where γ < 1. From (11), we conclude that the second term on the right-hand
side of equation (10) is bounded by eac γ
1−γ
e−λt. Therefore,
µ0(−∞, a)e
−λt ≤ µt(−∞, a) ≤
(
β + eac
γ
1− γ
)
e−λt, (12)
and the proof is complete.
4 Multi-Agent Meetings
For the case of m agents at each meeting, the evolution of the cross-sectional
distribution of types is similarly given by:
µt = µ0 + λ
∫ t
0
(µ∗ms − µs) ds, (13)
as explained in Duffie and Manso (2007). A solution for the cross-sectional
distribution of beliefs at any time t is given explicitly by (8) and the following
extension of the Wild summation formula for the type distribution.
Proposition 3 The unique solution of (13) is
µt =
∑
n≥1
a[(m−1)(n−1)+1]e
−λt(1− e−(m−1)λt)n−1µ
∗[(m−1)(n−1)+1]
0 , (14)
5See, for example, Rosenthal (2000), pp. 90-92.
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where a1 = 1 and, for n > 1,
a(m−1)(n−1)+1 =
1
m− 1

1−
∑

i1,...,i(m−1)<nP
ik=n+m−2
ff
m−1∏
k=1
a[(m−1)(ik−1)+1]

 . (15)
Proof From (13), the Fourier transform of µt satisfies
∂ϕ(s, t)
∂t
= −λϕ(s, t) + λϕm(s, t), (16)
whose solution satisfies
ϕ(s, t)m−1 =
ϕ(s, 0)m−1
e(m−1)λt(1− ϕm−1(s, 0)) + ϕm−1(s, 0)
. (17)
Following steps analogous to those of Proposition 1,
µ
∗(m−1)
t =
∑
n≥1
e−(m−1)λt(1− e−(m−1)λt)n−1µ
∗(m−1)n
0 . (18)
Let νt denote the right-hand side of (14). By recursively calculating the
convolution,
ν
∗(m−1)
t =
(∑
n≥1
a[(m−1)(n−1)+1]e
−λt(1− e−(m−1)λt)n−1µ
∗[(m−1)(n−1)+1]
0
)∗(m−1)
=
∑
n≥1
βne
−(m−1)λt(1− e−(m−1)λt)n−1µ
∗(m−1)n
0 (19)
=
∑
n≥1
e−(m−1)λt(1− e−(m−1)λt)n−1µ
∗(m−1)n
0 , (20)
where
βn =
∑

i1,...,i(m−1)P
ik=n+m−2
ff
m−1∏
k=1
a[(m−1)(ik−1)+1],
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and where the last equality follows from the definition of a[(m−1)(n−1)+1] for
n ≥ 1. Thus, ν
∗(m−1)
t = µ
∗(m−1)
t , and it remains to show that the distribution
µt is uniquely characterized by its convolution of order m− 1. This follows
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from the fact that µ0, and therefore µ
∗k
t for any t and k, have a moment
generating function in a neighborhood of zero and a non-zero first moment
on the event {X = H}.
Proposition 4 For any meeting group size m, convergence of the cross-
sectional distribution of beliefs to that of complete information is exponential
at the rate λ.
Proof Again, it is enough to derive the rate of convergence of µt(−∞, a) to
zero on the event {X = H}. From (14),
µt(−∞, a) ≥ e
−λtµ0(−∞, a). (21)
Now, from (18) and our analysis in Section 3, we know that for some constant
κ > 0,
µ∗(m−1)(−∞, (m− 1)a) ≤ κe−(m−1)λt. (22)
From the fact that
(µ(−∞, a))m−1 ≤ µ∗(m−1)(−∞, (m− 1)a), (23)
we conclude that
µ(−∞, a) ≤ κ
1
m−1 e−λt. (24)
From (21) and (24), it follows that the rate of convergence of µt(−∞, a) to
zero is λ, completing the proof.
Because the expected rate at which a particular individual enters meetings
is λ per year, independence and a formal application of the law of large
6Because, on {X = H}, the derivative of the moment generating function of µ0 at zero
is the first moment of µ0, which is positive, the moment generating function is strictly less
than 1 in an interval (−ǫ, 0], for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0. This implies that there is an
analogous explicit solution for the moment generating function of µ∗n
t
, for any n and t, on a
small negative interval. The (m−1)-st root of the moment generating function of µ
∗(m−1)
t
,
on such an interval, uniquely determines the associated measure µt. For additional details,
see Billingsley (1986), p. 408.
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numbers implies that the total quantity of m-agent meetings per year is
λ/m, almost surely. So the total annual attendance at meetings is almost
surely λ per year, invariant7 to m. Our results show that total attendance
at meetings is what matters for information convergence rates.
We have not shown that our invariance result extends from the case of a
constant group size to a model in which the group size varies at random from
meeting to meeting, say with the same mean group size across meetings. This
is in fact the case under technical conditions on the distribution of group sizes,
as related to us by Semyon Malamud in a subsequent private communication.
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